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EPISTEMIC DEPENDENCE 
 
 
Duncan Pritchard 
University of Edinburgh  
 
 
ABSTRACT. The goal of this paper is to explore and defend the epistemic dependence of 
knowledge⎯roughly, the dependence of one’s knowledge on factors outwith one’s cognitive 
agency⎯and to situate this thesis within a wider framework for thinking about knowledge, 
one on which knowledge demands both cognitive agency and extra-agential factors. It is 
argued that the epistemic dependence thesis comes in both positive (knowledge-enabling) and 
negative (knowledge-precluding) forms, and that properly understood it runs contrary to a 
number of central movements in contemporary epistemology. Despite appearances, the 
question of whether one’s epistemology allows for epistemic dependence runs orthogonal to 
the epistemic externalism/internalism distinction. Instead, it reflects a rather different dispute 
between epistemic individualism and epistemic anti-individualism. A narrow form of epistemic 
individualism is contrasted with a broader form that allows for extended cognitive processes. 
While our initial focus is on perceptual knowledge specifically, it is also shown that with this 
framework in place, the prospects for a distinctively social epistemic anti-individualism are very 
sound. Furthermore, it is claimed that this result is not specific to a particular social kind of 
knowledge, but rather reflects a point about knowledge in general. This is brought out by 
considering epistemic twin earth arguments that demonstrate the general epistemic dependence of 
knowledge. Social epistemic anti-individualism is thus motivated on more general anti-
individualist grounds, reflecting the wider reach of the epistemic dependence thesis. The 
rationale for this thesis within a broader approach to knowledge that allows for both agential 
and extra-agential factors to play a role⎯what I call anti-luck virtue epistemology⎯is then 
explored. 
 
 
1. EPISTEMIC DEPENDENCE IN OUTLINE 
 
I take it as relatively uncontroversial that the acquisition of knowledge requires the manifestation 
of relevant cognitive agency in arriving at the true belief in question.1 In order for it to be one’s 
knowledge at all, it must in some robust way be the product of one’s cognitive agency. (For now 
we will be treating cognitive agency as a primitive notion; we will explore it further below). That 
places at least a minimal constraint on knowledge, which we can capture as follows: 
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A Weak Ability Condition on Knowledge 
When one knows that p, a significant part of the causal explanation of one’s cognitive success (i.e., 
one’s true belief that p) is one’s manifestation of relevant cognitive agency.2  
 
Put another way, this condition states that if one’s cognitive agency plays little or no explanatory 
role in one’s cognitive success⎯if one’s cognitive success is simply due to blind luck, say⎯then it 
can’t amount to knowledge. The condition is weak, however, in the sense that it is perfectly 
consistent with this condition that other factors outwith one’s cognitive agency can also play an 
explanatory role in one’s cognitive success too. Relatedly, this condition is compatible with there 
being other epistemic conditions that must be met in order to gain knowledge, and some of these 
conditions might be such that they are independent of one’s manifestation of cognitive agency 
(e.g., such as a modal epistemic condition, like a safety or sensitivity condition).3 My suggestion is 
that the ability intuition is sound, and that it at the very least imposes this kind of weak ability 
condition on knowledge.   
 One question we might ask at this stage is just how strong a relationship is there between 
knowledge and the manifestation of cognitive agency. In particular, could we think of knowledge 
as primarily about the manifestation of cognitive agency, such that extra-agential factors in fact 
play at most a minor role? I think many in epistemology are tempted by such a thought, at least as 
regards most forms of knowledge anyway. I will be arguing, however, that in fact the weak ability 
condition is the most demanding general constraint we should expect to be imposed on 
knowledge by the ability intuition alone. This is because knowledge in general often involves extra-
agential factors.  
 Consider the following thesis that I will be defending, which I will call the epistemic dependence 
thesis:4 
 
Epistemic Dependence Thesis 
Whether or not an agent’s undefeated epistemic support for her true belief that p counts as 
knowledge that p can significantly depend upon factors outwith her cognitive agency. 
 
A few comments about this thesis are required in order to understand what it demands. Note first 
that it is stipulated here that the agent in question has a true belief in the target proposition. This is 
important because that the truth of one’s belief when one knows often depends on factors outwith 
one’s cognitive agency is hardly controversial. Second, note that it is also stipulated that the agent’s 
epistemic support for her true belief is undefeated. That defeaters, particularly normative 
defeaters,5 can influence whether one has knowledge is also fairly uncontroversial. In setting aside 
defeaters and stipulating that the belief in question is true, we are thus better able to bring to the 
fore what might be controversial about the epistemic dependence thesis. Finally, what is the 
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import of the word ‘significantly’ here? Perhaps not much. Indeed, one can almost certainly 
disregard it. It has been introduced in case there are views according to which there can be trivial 
ways in which the possession of knowledge depends on factors outwith one’s cognitive agency. If 
so, then we should set these trivial forms of epistemic dependence to one side, as it is only those 
extra-agential factors that significantly affect whether one knows that are relevant for our 
purposes.     
 With these preliminaries out of the way, consider now what the epistemic dependence thesis 
amounts to. It entails that two identical agents who exhibit the very same level of cognitive agency 
in bringing about their respective cognitive successes (and setting defeaters to one side) can 
nonetheless differ in terms of the epistemic standing of their beliefs on account of the bearing of 
non-agential factors. In particular, they can differ epistemically to the extent that while the one 
agent has knowledge, the other agent doesn’t. This is quite a striking thesis. While it is compatible 
with the weak ability condition on knowledge set-out above, it is likely to be in conflict with any 
more demanding version of that condition. The epistemic dependence thesis also runs counter to 
a number of contemporary epistemological proposals regarding knowledge. Moreover, as I shall 
explain in a moment, when epistemologists do endorse something like the epistemic dependence 
thesis, they do so only as regards a particular species of knowledge, such as testimonial knowledge 
(or even a specific kind of testimonial knowledge), and not with regard to knowledge in general. 
And yet I want to suggest that the epistemic dependence thesis captures an insight about 
knowledge simpliciter, and not merely as regards a particular kind of knowledge. 
 The epistemic dependence thesis can in fact be split into two sub-claims. They are as 
follows: 
 
Positive Epistemic Dependence 
Factors outwith one’s cognitive agency can enable one to gain (or retain) knowledge, even though 
one exhibits a level of cognitive agency that ordinarily would not suffice for knowing (i.e., typically, 
one’s counterpart, with an identical causal history and in the same environment, will lack knowledge).  
 
Negative Epistemic Dependence 
Factors outwith one’s cognitive agency can prevent one from gaining (or retaining) knowledge, even 
though one exhibits a level of cognitive agency that ordinarily would suffice for knowing (i.e., 
typically, one’s counterpart, with an identical causal history and in the same environment, will acquire 
knowledge).  
 
The point is that the epistemic dependence thesis as formulated above leaves it open whether the 
extra-agential factors at issue are preventing knowledge or enabling knowledge. I think that they can 
do both. In certain cases one can acquire or retain knowledge that one wouldn’t otherwise possess 
due to extra-agential factors⎯this is positive epistemic dependence. In other cases one is prevented from 
acquiring or retaining knowledge that one would otherwise possess due to extra-agential 
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factors⎯this is negative epistemic dependence.6  
 Now one might think that the epistemic dependence thesis is only controversial to the 
extent that one is an epistemic internalist, in that epistemic externalists will have no problem 
endorsing this thesis. For our purposes we will take epistemic internalism about knowledge to be 
the view that knowledge entails internalist justification, where the latter is understood along either 
accessibilist or mentalist lines.7 Epistemic externalism, in contrast, we will take to be the denial of 
this thesis, and hence the view that one can possess knowledge even while lacking internalist 
justification. So construed, one can immediately see the prima facie tension between the epistemic 
dependence thesis and epistemic internalism, in that one would expect the satisfaction of the 
internalist justification condition to be a manifestation of the subject’s cognitive agency, and hence 
for the possession of knowledge to vary in line with the possession of internalist justification.  
 Note, however, that it is only if epistemic internalism is understood as the view that 
undefeated internalist justification is sufficient for knowledge that it is incompatible with the 
epistemic dependence thesis. It would then follow that two agents with undefeated internalist 
justification for their respective true beliefs must be alike with regard to whether those beliefs 
amount to knowledge, contrary to the epistemic dependence thesis. But insofar as we characterize 
epistemic internalism as merely the demand that internalist justification is necessary for knowledge, 
then there is nothing to prevent such a view from incorporating further external epistemic 
conditions on knowledge (e.g., a modal condition, like safety or sensitivity) and thereby allowing 
extra-agential factors to play a role with regard to knowledge. It follows that epistemic internalism 
is at least in principle compatible with the epistemic dependence thesis.  
 Just as one can in principle be an epistemic internalist and endorse the epistemic 
dependence thesis, so one can in principle be an epistemic externalist and reject this thesis. 
Consider, for example, such views as process reliabilism, proper functionalism, or virtue 
reliabilism.8 While some of these views incorporate a ‘defeater’ condition which is usually 
understood (at least in part) along extra-agential lines,9 once we set this to one side there is a 
general consensus that knowledge is straightforwardly a function of cognitive agency, such that 
counterpart agents who are alike in terms of their manifestation of cognitive agency in acquiring 
true beliefs will also be alike in terms of whether they know the propositions believed.10  
 This brings us to an important point about the notion of cognitive agency, which we have so 
far been treating as a primitive notion. For while epistemic internalists often make much of the 
importance of cognitive agency, at least in the form of taking epistemic responsibility for one’s 
beliefs, appeals to cognitive agency in our understanding of knowledge are common to both 
mainstream epistemic internalist and epistemic externalist proposals. The difference is that 
epistemic externalists hold that cognitive agency need not be an especially reflective matter, but 
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may rather be due to the appropriate performance of the subject’s cognitive processes, where 
these are processes that are stable cognitive traits which are sufficiently integrated with the 
subject’s other cognitive traits to form part of her overall cognitive character. In this way, 
according to epistemic externalist proposals, such as virtue reliabilism, one’s cognitive agency can 
play an explanatory role in one’s cognitive success even though that cognitive success was 
produced by entirely unreflective cognitive processes.11 
 In any case, the important point is that the issue of epistemic dependence is orthogonal to 
the epistemic externalism/internalism distinction, in that it is possible for proposals on either side 
of this division to accept or reject this thesis. For while both kinds of proposals tend to 
understand knowledge as a straightforward function of cognitive agency⎯albeit in such a way that 
each proposal characterises cognitive agency very differently⎯they could both opt to incorporate 
an extra-agential externalist epistemic condition, such as a purely modal epistemic condition, into 
their account if they wished. It follows that we shouldn’t be casting the debate about epistemic 
dependence along epistemic externalist/internalist lines. Instead, I want to suggest that the best 
way to represent this debate is in terms of the distinction between epistemic individualism and epistemic 
anti-individualism. 
 
 
2. EPISTEMIC INDIVIDUALISM/ANTI-INDIVIDUALISM 
 
In the last section we unpacked the idea behind epistemic dependence in terms of a pairing of 
counterpart agents whose cognitive success was equally attributable to cognitive agency (defeaters 
aside). We noted that a consequence of the epistemic dependence thesis was a certain claim about 
identical agents exhibiting identical levels of cognitive agency nonetheless differing in terms of 
whether they possessed knowledge. It would be helpful to clarify the claim in play here, and I 
think the best way to do so is in terms of the particular supervenience thesis that is being rejected 
by epistemic dependence.  
 Consider the following thesis, which I will christen unextended epistemic individualism: 
 
Unextended Epistemic Individualism 
The epistemic support enjoyed by an agent’s true beliefs weakly supervenes on the internal features 
of that agent.  
 
This thesis demands that if two agents are identical in terms of their internal features⎯where this 
means, in particular, the internal physical features of the agent relevant to cognitive agency⎯and 
the environments in which they occupy, and they both truly believe that p, then they are also alike 
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in terms of whether they know that p. Note that this is a weak supervenience claim, in the sense 
that we are keeping the agents in identical environments. Indeed, strictly speaking, weak 
supervenience demands that the two agents occupy the same possible world, but for our purposes 
all that is important is that they occupy causal environments which are identical in all relevant 
respects, and that they also have causal histories that are identical in all relevant respects.12 Note 
too that given how we are understanding this supervenience claim, we can now dispense with a 
caveat about defeaters. However one wishes to understand defeaters, agents alike in terms of their 
internal features, causal environments and causal history will presumably also be alike in terms of 
the defeaters to which they are subject (and responsive to those defeaters in the same ways).13   
 So construed, many epistemological proposals regarding knowledge will accept this claim. 
That standard forms of epistemic internalism, like mentalism, will subscribe to it ought to be 
uncontroversial. But it is also widely held by epistemic externalists. Process reliabilism, for 
example, as defended by Alvin Goldman (e.g., 1986) and others, focuses on cognitive processes 
that are internal to the agent (i.e., under the skin and skull of the subject).14 Here, for example, is 
Goldman on this point: 
 
“One thing we do not want to do is invoke factors external to the cognizer’s psychology. The sorts 
of processes we’re discussing are purely internal processes.” (Goldman 1986, 51) 
 
Similarly, virtue reliabilists, like Ernest Sosa (1991; 2007; 2009; 2015) and John Greco (e.g., 2009), 
understand knowledge in terms of the manifestation of cognitive abilities that have a physical basis 
in the subject. Sosa, for example, understands cognitive abilities in terms of what he calls 
‘competences’, which he characterizes as follows: 
 
“[A] competence is a disposition, one with its basis resident in the competent agent, one that would 
in appropriately normal conditions ensure (or make highly likely) the success of any relevant 
performance issued by it.” (Sosa 2007, 29)  
 
 The epistemic dependence thesis is clearly in conflict with unextended epistemic 
individualism. The latter demands that identical agents who exhibit the same level of cognitive 
agency in bringing about their undefeated cognitive success should enjoy equal levels of epistemic 
support for their beliefs. And yet the former allows that these two agents could nonetheless differ 
epistemically in terms of whether or not they have knowledge.  
 We might wonder, however, whether the unextended epistemic individualism thesis is the 
right way to capture opposition to the epistemic dependence thesis. The epistemic dependence 
thesis, after all, just talks more generally about factors internal and external to cognitive agency, 
while the unextended epistemic individualism thesis makes a more specific claim about factors that 
are internal to the agent herself (i.e., physically internal). The reason why this distinction could be 
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important is that one can imagine views according to which one’s cognitive processes are 
extended⎯i.e., they include as proper parts elements of the world that are outside of one’s skin and 
skull. Although a controversial view in epistemology, extended cognition is widely endorsed in 
cognitive science circles. In any case, the point is that we can imagine a kind of epistemic 
individualism which makes an analogous claim to the unextended epistemic individualism thesis 
but which allows that the cognitive processes in question can be extended. We would thus get 
something like this thesis:  
 
Extended Epistemic Individualism  
The epistemic support enjoyed by an agent’s true beliefs weakly supervenes on that agent’s 
manifestation of cognitive agency. 
 
In this formulation of epistemic individualism there is no demand that the supervenience is 
concerned with the internal features of the agent specifically, but only that it concerns 
manifestations of cognitive agency, leaving it open whether this manifestation of cognitive agency 
is unextended or extended. We also now have a clearer sense of what facts should be kept fixed 
when evaluating the epistemic standing of the true beliefs held by counterpart agents⎯viz., those 
facts which are relevant to their manifestation of cognitive agency (which will of course include 
relevant facts about their causal environment, their causal history, and so forth).  
 Now one might baulk at the idea that any epistemological view that endorses extended 
cognition is a genuine kind of epistemic individualism, on the grounds that this is to introduce 
‘external’ factors into one’s epistemology. But that is to misunderstand the extended cognition 
thesis. The reasoning behind this view, after all, is that cognitive processes that extend outside of 
the skin and skull of the subject are nonetheless as much a part of the subject’s cognitive processes 
than those that don’t so extend. In a sense, then, nothing ‘external’ to the subject’s cognitive 
agency is being introduced by such views.15  
 The idea that epistemological proposals that incorporated extended cognition could still 
qualify as forms of epistemological individualism is further reinforced by considering particular 
possible views in this regard. To take an extreme⎯and admittedly rather implausible⎯example, 
imagine a mentalist who nonetheless endorses the extended mind thesis (where the latter is, note, a 
potentially much more ambitious thesis than the extended cognitive thesis).16 On this view, 
epistemic standing would still supervene on one’s mental states, it is just that one’s mental states 
now extend beyond the skin and skull of the subject. Crucially, however, epistemic standing is still 
supervening on the cognitive agency of the subject, it is just that we have an extended conception 
of cognitive agency. Or, to take another example, imagine an extended version of virtue reliabilism 
that allows in certain very specific epistemic conditions for a subject’s use of an instrument to 
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count as an extended cognitive process. Again, epistemic standing is still on this view supervening 
on the cognitive agency of the subject, it is just that this cognitive agency is understood along 
extended lines. Note too that the cognitive extension needn’t be restricted to instruments, but can 
also potentially involve other agents too, at least to the extent that one uses the other agent in ways 
comparable to an instrument (the reason for this caveat will become apparent below).  
 In any case, the epistemic dependence thesis is not just in conflict with the unextended 
epistemic individualism thesis, but also the extended epistemic individualism thesis. Epistemic 
dependence, after all, insists that two agents alike in terms of their manifestation of cognitive 
agency (extended or unextended), and also alike in all other relevant respects, can nonetheless 
differ in terms of whether they have knowledge. Henceforth when I refer to epistemic 
individualism I will have the extended epistemic individualism thesis in mind. The question in 
hand is whether we should endorse this thesis or instead embrace epistemic dependence and 
thereby become epistemic anti-individualists.  
 
 
3. SOCIAL EPISTEMIC ANTI-INDIVIDUALISM 
 
Although I have argued above that the dominant view in epistemology as a whole is epistemic 
individualism, it should be admitted that there is a particular region of epistemology where one 
does encounter mainstream versions of epistemic anti-individualism. This is in the literature on the 
epistemology of testimony.  
 There are various reasons for this. One motivation relates to the fact that in a testimonial 
exchange one’s informant⎯perhaps even one’s epistemic community more generally⎯seems to 
be able to bear some of the epistemic weight as regards the epistemic status of my testimonial 
belief. Indeed, if this is not so then it is hard to account for the fact that agents often acquire 
testimonial knowledge without having very much by way of rational support and without more 
generally doing very much in terms of exhibiting cognitive agency. Thus, while a weak ability 
condition on knowledge is satisfied, it would be implausible to suppose that the testimonial 
knowledge so acquired was solely or even primarily the result of the agent’s manifestation of 
cognitive agency. Thus there seems to be a form of positive epistemic dependence in play, such 
that extra-agential factors ensure that very little by way of manifestation of cognitive agency can 
suffice for knowledge.  
 Consider, for example, so-called ‘transmission’ views of the epistemology of testimony 
whereby if one stands in the right kind of relationship to one’s informant then in believing that 
testimony one can acquire the informant’s epistemic basis for belief.17 On this view it is clearly the 
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case that the epistemic standing of my belief can depend on factors outwith the manifestation of 
my cognitive agency, since it depends on the epistemic standing of one’s informant’s belief. Two 
agents could thus be alike in all relevant respects, and yet differ in terms of whether they have 
testimonial knowledge on account of facts to do with their respective informants.18  
 Or consider the kind of view defended by Sanford Goldberg (e.g., 2011) whereby it is not 
just the epistemic standing of one’s informant’s belief which has a bearing on the epistemic 
standing of one’s own testimony-based belief, in that one’s social environment can also play a role. 
In particular, Goldberg tells a persuasive story about how social practices of monitoring and 
policing testimony within a community can have a bearing on the epistemic standing of one’s 
testimonial beliefs. This would be a straightforward kind of positive epistemic dependence with 
one’s social environment playing the extra-agential role, in that where these social practices tend to 
weed-out unreliable testimony, so one is able to acquire testimonial knowledge without having to 
exhibit very much by way of cognitive agency (and certainly much less than is typically required for 
knowledge).19 Accordingly, two counterpart agents displaying equivalent levels of cognitive agency 
could nonetheless differ in terms of whether they acquire testimonial knowledge.    
 Notice that on both views it is important that the recipient of testimony does not treat their 
informant as a mere instrument. If that were the case, then the epistemic weight may well solely lie 
on the shoulders of the recipient of the testimony. On both views the claim is rather that there is 
something about the particular social fabric against which this testimonial interaction is occurring 
which ensures that one’s informant, or even one’s wider social environment, can carry part of the 
epistemic load. Indeed, it is worth noting in this regard that insofar as one is merely treating an 
informant as an instrument, then the case for offering a specific epistemological account of this 
knowledge (qua testimonial knowledge) is not very pressing. That is, why should knowledge gained 
from an informant in this way be significantly different from, say, knowledge gained from a 
thermometer? In particular, if epistemic individualism is applicable in the latter case, then why not 
also the former case? Relatedly, it is also worth noting that insofar as one embraces extended 
cognition, then it is open to one to treat the instrumental use of an informant as being, in the right 
epistemic conditions, a form of extended knowledge which is on a par with non-social kinds of 
extended knowledge. As such, it would be entirely compatible with epistemic individualism, as we 
noted above.20      
 Of course, such views are thought controversial in some quarters, but it is not my current 
concern to defend epistemic anti-individualism as regards the epistemology of testimony, but 
rather to merely register its existence. I want to make two observations here. The first is the 
straightforward point that the proponents of epistemic individualism that we noted above⎯a 
 10 
broad class of positions, as we saw⎯simply cannot accommodate the kind of testimonial 
knowledge that prompts epistemologists of testimony to opt for anti-individualist accounts. They 
will either need to redescribe such cases such that high levels of cognitive agency are on display, 
despite appearances, or else deny that the agents in question do gain bona fide knowledge.21  
 My second observation is more substantive. It is that we should not think that the 
phenomenon of epistemic dependence, if genuine at all, is specific to testimonial cases. That is, 
one might suppose that while there are grounds for epistemic dependence, and thus epistemic 
anti-individualism, they only concern testimonial knowledge on account of its specifically social 
dimension (the epistemic dependence in question being an epistemic dependence on social factors, 
such as regarding one’s informant or one’s wider epistemic community). If this were correct, then 
it would at least marginalise epistemic anti-individualism. As I will be arguing in the next section, 
however, epistemic dependence is a genuine phenomenon, and moreover it is one which has 
application to knowledge in general, and not just testimonial knowledge.  
  
 
4. EPISTEMIC TWIN-EARTH 
 
Standard twin earth arguments run as follows.22 Despite appearances there is no water on twin 
earth. Water is essentially H2O, and all the watery stuff on twin earth has the different 
microstructure XYZ—earthlings call that ‘twin-water’. When S on earth utters ‘water is wet’, she 
expresses the proposition that water is wet, but when S’s intrinsic physical duplicate on twin earth 
utters the same sentence, twin-S expresses the proposition that twin-water is wet.23 In order to 
keep the argument as clean as possible, we will stipulate that S shares an identical causal history to 
twin-S, bar concerning their interactions with water/twin-water. We will also stipulate that S and 
twin-S are ignorant of chemistry. Since S and twin-S refer to different kinds of stuff when they 
token ‘water’, the truth-conditions of their respective utterances differ. Assuming that the contents 
of their beliefs are fixed by the truth-conditional contents of the sentences that they use to express 
those beliefs, then these contents also fail to supervene on their intrinsic physical properties. 
Indeed if belief states are individuated in part by their contents, then what belief states S and twin-
S are in fail to supervene on their intrinsic physical properties. Instead these states depend partially 
for their individuation on which patterns of causal relations S and twin-S bear to their respective 
physical environments. 
Consider now epistemic twin earth on which most watery stuff is H2O. In between there is 
some scattered twin-water the exact location of which varies from case to case. My contention is 
that we can run an epistemic twin earth argument which shows that whether a subject’s epistemic 
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support for a true belief amounts to knowledge can depend on factors outwith her cognitive 
agency. In short, an epistemic twin earth argument motivates the epistemic dependence thesis and 
hence epistemic anti-individualism. Moreover, crucially, this argument will be concerned with 
perceptual knowledge, and will be clearly also extendable to other varieties of knowledge. Hence 
we will have shown that epistemic anti-individualism has application beyond just the social anti-
individualism advocated in the epistemology of testimony literature.24    
Let’s divide epistemic twin earth into three regions. The subject’s local environment is where 
the subject is currently located. It contains the objects and properties that are the proximate causes 
of her current perceptual experiences, experiences that prompt her to form a belief in the target 
proposition (p). Other features of the local environment have to do with aspects of the perceptual 
process and various background conditions on perception⎯e.g., distorting noise, brightness, and 
so on. 
The subject’s regional environment is neither where the subject is currently located, nor where 
she typically forms any beliefs. Still, it contains the objects and properties with which she might 
easily have been causally connected. The regional environment thus concerns modally nearby 
perceptual possibilities, but they play no causal role in producing the subject’s current perceptual 
experience on which she bases her belief that p.       
Finally, the subject’s global environment is where she is normally located although not at 
present. It contains the objects and properties with which she ordinarily causally interacts. Given 
the subject’s current location, the global environment concerns distant perceptual possibilities, 
which as such are also causally inefficacious in producing her current perceptual experiences, and 
hence play no role in her formation of her belief that p. 
We can now mount an epistemic twin earth argument for the epistemic dependence thesis. 
The subject, S, is on earth where all watery stuff is H2O. S’s perceptual apparatus is highly reliable 
in that a high frequency of S’s perceptual beliefs is both actually true and true across relevantly 
close worlds. Based on a perceptual experience as of water, S forms the demonstrative belief that 
that’s water. There is no question that S thereby comes to know just that. 
On epistemic twin earth all watery stuff in twin-S’s global environment is H2O. Not only is 
twin-S therefore able to entertain water-thoughts, a high frequency of twin-S’s water-beliefs as 
formed in her global environment is true both in actual fact and across relevantly close worlds. 
Twin-S’s perceptual apparatus is thus equally reliable. Moreover, all watery stuff in twin-S’s local 
environment is H2O. When twin-S forms the demonstrative belief that that’s water on the basis of 
a perceptual experience as of water, her belief is true. Yet, unbeknownst to twin-S, twin-water is 
abundant in her regional environment. The basis on which twin-S holds that belief is thus such 
that her belief is only luckily true, in that given the basis for her belief it could very easily have 
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been the case that she would have formed a false belief (e.g., had she been interacting, 
unbeknownst to her, with twin-water). That is to say, very easily could twin-S have believed that 
that’s water on the same basis—a perceptual experience as of water—without that being so.25 
Since it is standardly thought that knowledge excludes high levels of epistemic luck or risk, such 
that forming a true belief on a basis that could very easily have led to a false belief is not 
compatible with gaining knowledge, it follows that twin-S lacks knowledge.26 
We thus have two agents exhibiting equally high levels of cognitive agency and forming a 
true belief on this basis. And yet for the one agent the epistemic standing of her belief suffices for 
knowledge, but not so the other agent. We thus have a case of positive epistemic dependence, in 
that despite a high level of manifestation of cognitive agency on display⎯of a level that would 
ordinarily suffice for knowledge⎯our counterpart agent on twin earth nonetheless lacks 
knowledge due to an extra-agential factor.  
The explanation the epistemic individualist offers of why S has knowledge on earth is that 
her cognitive success is due to her manifestation of cognitive agency. The challenge, however, is to 
explain why twin-S lacks knowledge on epistemic twin earth. The fact that S and twin-S are 
intrinsic physical duplicates with essentially identical causal histories embedded in physically 
identical local and global environments means that one cannot plausibly suppose that they are 
distinct in terms of their manifestation of cognitive agency.  
Consider the following analogy, one that is often used by proponents of virtue 
epistemology who endorse epistemic individualism. Suppose that S is an expert archer. S possesses 
that ability in virtue of relevant bodily/psychological features and mostly occupying an 
environment that is conducive for her to frequently hit the innermost rings when dispatching 
arrows. Given that the latter are equally true of twin-S, she will be an expert archer too. And the 
fact that both S and twin-S currently occupy physically identical local environments means that 
their cognitive successes must arise in the very same way. To use the analogy, the ways in which S 
and twin-S propel their respective arrows into the yellow ring are identical. After all, fletching, bow 
strings, body positions, prevailing winds, distances to target, energy imparted to arrows, and so on, 
are identical in the two cases. Combining these two facts spells trouble for epistemic anti-
individualism for it deprives proponents of this view of a principled basis on which they can treat 
the two cases differently. And yet there clearly is an epistemic difference between them, in that 
twin-S, unlike her counterpart S, lacks knowledge (at least insofar as knowledge excludes high 
levels of epistemic luck/risk, as is standardly supposed).  
How might the epistemic individualist respond to this argument? It is hard to see how they 
could motivate a conception of cognitive agency that somehow marks a difference between S and 
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twin-S. But that means that they are obliged to allow that knowledge is not a straightforward 
function of cognitive agency, and that is to endorse the epistemic dependence thesis, and hence 
epistemic anti-individualism. Notice too that while we have run this argument in terms of 
perceptual knowledge, we could easily extend the argument to other forms of knowledge (e.g., 
memorial knowledge). Finally, it should also be obvious that we have likely kept far more facts 
fixed across earth and twin-earth than we strictly needed to keep fixed in order to run the 
argument. We have done this in order to make clear that what is at issue here is not merely a 
particular conception of cognitive agency⎯there simply is no plausible conception of cognitive 
agency on which purely modal facts have a bearing on one’s manifestation of cognitive agency. 
More generally, though, all that we really needed to keep fixed across earth and twin-earth are 
those facts relevant to the manifestation of cognitive agency, and that is likely to be a much 
smaller class of facts than those kept fixed in our argument above.  
Indeed, with this last point in mind we can easily see how the kind of epistemic anti-
individualism one finds in the epistemology of testimony, as described above, can be understood 
in terms of an epistemic twin-earth argument. For example, if proponents of the transmission view 
are right, then two agents can be completely alike in terms of their manifestation of cognitive 
agency and yet differ in terms of whether they have knowledge on account of the epistemic 
standing of their informant’s belief. Or if proponents of intersubjective views are right, then two 
agents can be completely alike in terms of their manifestation of cognitive agency and yet differ in 
terms of whether they have knowledge on account of differences in the social facts that obtain 
across earth and twin-earth. In both cases, one would be running a more liberal version of the 
epistemic twin-earth argument, in that one would be allowing for more factual differences across 
the two earths. But the essential point is the same, which is that keeping the facts relevant to the 
subject’s manifestation of cognitive agency fixed does not ensure that counterpart agents are alike 
in terms of whether they have knowledge. Instead, extra-agential factors, such as concerning one’s 
social environment, can have a bearing on whether or not one has knowledge.   
 
 
5. ANTI-LUCK VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY 
 
So once we recognise that epistemic dependence is a general phenomenon, then this both 
supports epistemic anti-individualist proposals in the epistemology of testimony while also 
demonstrating that such anti-individualism is not restricted to the social realm. In accepting the 
epistemic dependence thesis as regards knowledge in general, as opposed to just a certain kind of 
knowledge, one is required to think rather differently about what knowledge is. In particular, I 
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think that it suggests a view of knowledge that I have labelled anti-luck virtue epistemology.  
 The driving idea behind anti-luck virtue epistemology is that knowledge demands cognitive 
success that is not subject to high levels of epistemic risk⎯call this safe cognitive success⎯and where 
this safe cognitive success reflects the manifestation of a significant level of cognitive agency. That 
is, one’s safe cognitive success must be to some significant degree attributable to one’s 
manifestation of cognitive agency. Note that this is in effect a structural proposal, in that one can 
plug-in any number of specific epistemological views into this general template. In particular, the 
‘virtue’ component of the view just concerns an appeal to cognitive agency, and we have already 
seen that there are a range of very different ways of understanding cognitive agency (e.g., in terms 
of whether one is an epistemic internalist or externalist). Note too that it is an open question 
whether this is a reductive account of knowledge. While I am personally optimistic on this score, it 
doesn’t really matter for our purposes. In particular, one could endorse a knowledge-first approach 
in epistemology and yet still embrace anti-luck virtue epistemology (e.g., if one held that any 
plausible account of cognitive agency must already appeal to a prior notion of knowledge).27  
 What is crucial to the proposal, however, is that it allows for epistemic dependence, of 
both a positive and a negative variety. This is because on this view knowledge can involve an 
interplay between agential and extra-agential factors. In particular, it can accommodate positive 
epistemic dependence in virtue of the fact that in epistemically propitious conditions very little by 
way of cognitive agency can nonetheless suffice for knowledge. In such conditions, after all, safe 
cognitive success is easy to come by.  
Consider, for example, the positive epistemic dependence we have witnessed in the 
epistemology of testimony. In the right social conditions⎯where this means social conditions 
which are epistemically propitious⎯one can gain testimonial knowledge by exhibiting very little by 
way of cognitive agency. (Though one needs to exercise some cognitive agency⎯gullibility is not a 
route to testimonial knowledge, even on transmission views). And this is precisely because these 
social factors are taking on some of the epistemic burden in ensuring that one has a safe cognitive 
success.  
By the same token, anti-luck virtue epistemology can also account for the negative 
epistemic dependence that was at issue in our original epistemic twin earth case involving 
perceptual knowledge. In this case, recall, the conditions on twin earth were epistemically 
unfavourable, such that even though the subject manifested a high level of cognitive agency⎯a 
level that would ordinarily suffice for knowledge⎯she nonetheless lacked knowledge. Such a case 
highlights the point that no matter how demanding one sets the cognitive agency bar for 
knowledge, it will always be possible to construct an epistemic twin earth case whereby one’s 
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counterpart nonetheless lacks knowledge. (Moreover, note that raising the cognitive agency bar for 
knowledge in response to such cases would be a losing game anyway, in that it would make it 
harder for one to accommodate the positive epistemic dependence that one finds in testimonial 
cases, where very little by way of cognitive agency is required in order to acquire knowledge).  
The upshot is that taking epistemic dependence seriously means endorsing a kind of 
epistemic anti-individualism that allows for knowledge to involve an interplay between agential 
and extra-agential factors. In particular, we need a formulation that excludes high levels of 
epistemic risk (and hence which requires safe cognitive success), but which also demands an 
appropriate explanatory relationship between safe cognitive success and manifestation of cognitive 
agency. In some conditions, the manifestation of cognitive agency will be relatively minimal but 
still lead to knowledge on account of the presence of positive epistemic dependence. But in other 
cases the manifestation of cognitive agency can be relatively high and yet not lead to knowledge on 
account of the presence of negative epistemic dependence. Only anti-luck virtue epistemology can 
accommodate these two aspects of epistemic dependence. Epistemic dependence thus entails not 
only epistemic anti-individualism, but more specifically the particular kind of epistemic anti-
individualism presented by anti-luck virtue epistemology.28 
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NOTES 
 
1  Elsewhere, I have called this the ‘ability intuition’, and claimed that it is on a par with (though distinct from) the 
‘anti-luck intuition’, where the latter is the claim that knowledge is incompatible with cognitive success that could very 
easily have been cognitive failure. For more on the ability intuition, see Pritchard (2009b, chs. 1-4), Pritchard, Millar & 
Haddock (2010, chs. 2-4) and Pritchard (2012a). For more on the anti-luck intuition, see endnote 26.  
2  Although this doesn’t matter very much for our purposes, it should be noted why this condition is expressed in 
terms of the ‘manifestation’ of cognitive agency. In order to see why, consider an example offered by Turri (2011). 
That a famous soccer player scores lots of goals and that he gets paid a lot of money are both facts that are explained 
in large part by appeal to his prodigious footballing abilities. Notice, however, that only the former fact involves a 
manifestation of those footballing abilities. What goes for success and agency more generally also applies specifically 
to cognitive success and cognitive agency. When we are trying, as part of our theorising about knowledge, to capture 
the relevant explanatory role of cognitive agency in one’s cognitive success, I think it is clearly the manifestation of 
cognitive agency that we are interested in, rather than just the more general explanatory relation that lacks this detail. 
Note also that from here on I will take it as given that the cognitive abilities involved in a subject’s cognitive success 
are the relevant ones and hence drop this particular qualifier.   
3  For further discussion of modal conditions on knowledge, such as safety and sensitivity, see Pritchard (2008) and 
Black (2010).  
4  Note that the notion of ‘epistemic dependence’ has been explored by a number of authors in the literature⎯see, for 
example, Hardwig (1985) and Goldberg (2011)⎯but often the claim in play is different (sometimes subtly, sometimes 
radically) to that at issue here. Accordingly the reader should set these other usages of this terminology to one side. I 
have explored the notion of epistemic dependence as it appears here in a number of works. See especially Kallestrup 
& Pritchard (2013), and also Kallestrup & Pritchard (2011; 2012) and Carter & Pritchard (forthcoming). The impetus 
for this examination of epistemic dependence comes from my earlier critical work on robust virtue epistemology and 
my related defence of anti-luck virtue epistemology⎯see Pritchard (2009a; 2009b; 2012a) and Pritchard, Millar & 
Haddock (2010, chs. 2-4). 
5  That is, roughly, a defeater which one ought to be taking into account, even if one is in fact unaware of it.  
6  For more on the distinction between positive and negative epistemic dependence, see Kallestrup & Pritchard 
(2013).  
7  The locus classicus for defences of mentalism is Conee & Feldman (2004). For an influential defence of accessibilism 
(though not under this description), see Chisholm (1977). 
8  See Goldman (1986) for a high-profile defence process reliabilism. See Plantinga (1993) for an influential statement 
of proper functionalism. See Sosa (1991; 2007; 2009; 2015) and Greco (2009) for two prominent versions of virtue 
reliabilism (though note that of the two virtue-theoretic proposals, it is Greco’s view which is closer in spirit to 
reliabilism). 
9  See, for example, Goldman (1986, 62-63 & 111-12) on process reliabilism.  
10  The clearest examples of this kind of relationship between knowledge and cognitive agency are the kind of views 
which I have elsewhere described as ‘strong’ or ‘robust’ forms of virtue epistemology, as advanced by such figures as 
Sosa (1991; 2007; 2009; 2015), Greco (2009) and Zagzebski (1996; 1999). According to these proposals, knowledge 
just is cognitive success that is because of cognitive agency. I critically describe robust virtue epistemology in a number 
of places⎯see Pritchard (2009a, 2009b; 2012a) and Pritchard, Millar & Haddock (2010, chs. 2-4).).  
11  For more on the notion of cognitive integration, see Palermos (2014).  
12  To employ the terminology offered by Jackson & Pettit (1993), undefeated epistemic support is on this view ‘intra-
world narrow’ as opposed to being ‘inter-world narrow. For more on weak supervenience, see Kim (1984; 1987), 
McLaughlin (1995) and Kallestrup (2011).  
13  That said, if one has a view about defeaters such that our two agents could differ in this regard, then one should 
simply reinsert the ‘undefeated’ clause into the definition of unextended epistemic anti-individualism (the same goes 
for the extended epistemic anti-individualism thesis formulated below).  
14  For a helpful discussion of Goldman’s commitment to (what we are here calling) the unextended epistemic 
individualism thesis, see Goldberg (2012).  
15  The locus classicus for discussions of extended cognition⎯even though the target of the paper is in fact a stronger 
thesis, known as the extended mind thesis (see endnote 16)⎯is Clark & Chalmers (1998). For further discussion of 
the ramifications of the extended cognition thesis (and also the extended mind thesis) for mainstream epistemology, 
see Pritchard (2010) and Carter, Kallestrup, Palermos & Pritchard (2014).  
16  That is, while the extended cognition thesis argues that a subject’s cognitive processes can be extended, it doesn’t 
thereby hold that a subject’s mental states can be extended. Interestingly, the classic defence of the extended mind 
thesis⎯due to Clark & Chalmers (1998)⎯takes extended cognition as an uncontentious starting-point in the dialectic. 
17  See, for example, Moran (2005) and Faulkner (2011). For a helpful recent discussion of this kind of proposal, see 
Keren (2007).  
18  Interestingly, one could conceive of this view along epistemic internalist lines even though it is a form of epistemic 
anti-individualism. Faulkner (2011), for example, thinks that internalist epistemic support is required in order to gain 
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testimonial knowledge in such cases, though this functions rather as an ‘enabler’ for the transmission to occur, rather 
than being part of the epistemic support in virtue of which the agent knows. Even so, the epistemic internalist rubric 
that internalist justification is necessary for knowledge is met.  
19  One could express this point about epistemic anti-individualism in the epistemology of testimony in terms of the 
more familiar reductionism/anti-reductionism distinction in this field. But I think this will bring in additional 
complications that don’t concern us here, particularly since there are a variety of ‘hybrid’ positions that lie between 
traditional reductionist and anti-reductionist proposals. For an excellent survey of the literature on the epistemology of 
testimony, see Lackey (2010).  
20  Interestingly, while Goldberg (2012) allows for socially extended cognitive processes, he explicitly denies that there 
can be non-socially extended cognitive processes.  
21  In response to these kinds of testimonial cases, Sosa has made the intriguing remarks that his account can handle 
them by treating the agent’s cognitive success as being “attributable to a complex social competence only partially 
seated in the individual believer.” (2007, 97) It is unclear how to understand this suggestion, however, and Sosa 
doesn’t offer much by way of explanation. I take it that the broad idea is that whereas in standard cases of knowledge 
the epistemic competences on display are solely that of the individual knowing agent, in testimonial cases like the ones 
under consideration there is instead a shared ‘social competence’ that is displayed by the cognitive whole of a ‘testifier-
and-testifiee’. The problem with this proposal is that it is entirely antithetical to the individualistic spirit of virtue 
epistemology as Sosa describes it. This, after all, is the view that an agent has knowledge when her cognitive success is 
appropriately due to her cognitive ability, and we noted above that Sosa’s understanding of cognitive ability is in terms 
of competences that have a physical basis resident in the subject. For further discussion of the specific elements of 
Sosa’s epistemology, see Pritchard (2009a) and Kallestrup & Pritchard (forthcoming).   
22  See, for example, Putnam (1975). For a recent discussion of standard twin-earth arguments, see Kallestrup (2011, 
ch. 3). 
23  At least, S and twin-S are internal duplicates bar the fact that they differ to the extent that they are composed of 
water.  
24  For the original statement of the epistemic twin earth argument, see Kallestrup & Pritchard (2011). See also 
Kallestrup & Pritchard (2012; 2013). Note, though, that the original target of the argument is just a particular kind of 
virtue epistemology⎯robust virtue epistemology, as I have christened it⎯rather than a general point about epistemic 
dependence and epistemic anti-individualism. The epistemic twin earth argument is effectively a refinement of an 
earlier critique of robust virtue epistemology⎯see Pritchard (2009a, 2009b; 2012a) and Pritchard, Millar & Haddock 
(2010, chs. 2-4). 
25  If twin-S uttered ‘that’s water’ while demonstrating twin-water she would express the false proposition that that’s 
water. We assume that the concept of water as deployed on both earth and epistemic twin earth is a natural kind 
concept that applies to all and only H2O. One might envisage a loophole here for someone who denies the epistemic 
dependence thesis if twin-S’s utterance has the purely descriptive truth-condition: ‘that’s water’ is true iff that’s watery 
stuff, or the disjunctive truth-condition: ‘that’s water’ is true iff that’s water or that’s twin-water. We find both views 
implausible. The presence of small amounts of twin-water on epistemic twin earth implies neither that water is a 
functional kind in the way that, say, vitamin is, nor that water is a disjunctive kind in the way that, say, jade is. Even 
those with descriptivist or semantic internalist leanings insist that, to a first approximation, ‘water’ in someone’s 
mouth picks out the dominant watery stuff of their acquaintance. XYZ is neither dominant nor stuff with which 
adequate causal connections are sustained. In fact, Chalmers (1996, 58) is explicit that if the watery stuff in our world 
turned out to be a mixture of 95% H2O and 5% XYZ, the primary intension of ‘water’ would pick out only H2O. For 
more details, see Kallestrup (2011, chs. 3 & 4).             
26  I won’t be arguing for this anti-luck/risk intuition regarding knowledge here, though I have defended it extensively 
elsewhere, as have others. For defences of the anti-luck/risk intuition, see Pritchard (2005; 2007; 2008; 2012a; 2012b; 
2015; forthcoming). See also the recent exchange between Hetherington (2013) and Pritchard (2013). 
27  Williamson (2001) is, of course, the locus classicus for knowledge-first epistemology. I further discuss the question of 
whether anti-luck virtue epistemology should be cast along reductive or non-reductive lines in Pritchard, Millar & 
Haddock (2010, ch. 3). 
28  An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Sawyer Seminar Conference, ‘Issues in Collective 
Epistemology’, held at Northwestern University in October 2014. Thanks to the audience that day, and especially 
Sandy Goldberg and Deborah Tollefsen. Special thanks to my long-time collaborator Jesper Kallestrup⎯as noted in 
the footnotes, this paper draws on previous collaborative work that we have undertaken. This paper was produced as 
part of the ‘Extended Knowledge’ research project that is hosted by the University of Edinburgh’s Eidyn research 
centre and funded by a generous grant from the UK’s Arts and Humanities Research Council (♯AH/J011908/1).  
